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DR. A.M. NOSHIRAVAN 
iNrCRNAT.ONAL C E G A L A O V I S O R 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
In Re: 
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES 
Court of Appeals No. 880071-CA 
Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, No. C83-2368 
Supreme Court No. 860322 
Walter E. Heller Western 
Incorporated, a California 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
U.S. Rock Wool Company, Inc. 
a Utah corporation; 
V. Ross Ekins; S. 0. Ekins; 
et al., 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Dear Honorable Judges: 
After the Respondent's Brief was filed herein the Utah 
Court of Appeals has published a pertinent and significant 
decision which bears on one of the central issues of this cause, 
to-wit, the effect of impairment of collateral by the Lender on 
the obligation of a Guarantor. 
The referenced case is Valley Bank & Trust Company vs, 
Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., et al., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah App. 
1987), 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 66, filed September 1, 1987. A copy of 
said case is appended hereto for the convenience of the Court. 
The attention of the Court is directed to the portions 
of said opinion setting out the rationale for release in the 
event of impairment of security (see points 2,3, page 108), the 
rule of construction of language of instruments drafted by the 
Lender (point 4, page 110), and the effect under Utah law of such 
impairment (point 5, page 110). 
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Although the instant cause is governed by the law of 
the state of California, the cited opinion is instructive in this 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
. -.-^  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^y day of February, 
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Appellant 
50 West Broadway, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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rectly avoiding applicable United States Su-
preme Court precedent. See, e.g., State v. 
Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942, 947 
(1982); State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 876 
(Alaska 1978); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 
361, 520 R 2d 51, 58 (1974); People v. Bea-
vers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511, 616 
(1975), cert denied 423 U.S. 878, 96 S.Ct. 
152, 46 L.Ed.2d 111 (1976); O'Connor v. 
Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn.1979); 
Stnte v. Brackman, 178 Mont 105, 682 
P.2d 1216, 1220 (1978); Stnte v. Hunt, 91 
NJ. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982); State v. 
Kock, 302 Or. 29, 725 P.2d 1286, 1287 
(1986); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 896, 899 
(R. 1.1980); State v. Opperman, 247 
N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D.1976). 
Justice Zimmerman recently criticized 
the federal approach to warrantless 
searches: "The federal law regarding war-
rantless searches and seizures has become 
a labyrinth of rules built upon a series of 
contradictory and confusing rationaliza-
tions and distinctions." Hygh, 711 P.2d at 
271-72 (Zimmerman, J., concurring); see 
also State v. Johnson, 60 Utah Adv.Rep. 30, 
33 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J. concurring). 
While it is true that the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Carney has 
simplified the federal approach to the auto-
mobile exception under the fourth amend-
ment, it has done so at the sacrifice of the 
rights of the citizens of this nation to be 
secure in their effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures. The warning 
of Justice Jackson should be heeded: 
[Fourth amendment rights] . . . are not 
mere second-class rights but belong in 
the catalog of indispensable freedoms. 
Among deprivations of rights, none is so 
effective in cowering a population, crush-
ing the spirit of the individual and put 
ting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled 
search and seizure is one of the first and 
most effective weapons in the arsenal of 
every arbitrary government. 
Brinegar t> U.S., 388 U.S. 160, 180, 69 
S.Ct 1302, 1313, 98 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (Jack 
son, J., dissenting). 
Following many of her sister state 
courts, the Utah Supreme Court may take 
v. RITE WAY CONCRETE Utah 105 
109 (UuhApp. 1987) 
this opportunity to simplify Utah's vehicle 
search and seizure law without gutting the 
protection it provides to the citizens of this 
state. See State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1986). Warrantless vehicle searches 
could be restricted to only those situations 
where they serve their original purpose of 
protecting police officers and preventing 
the immediate destruction of evidence. 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
*x ( O *KtVNUM|fRSYl1l V 
VALLEY HANK AND TRUST COM PA-
NY, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
RITE WAY CONCRETE FORMING, 
INC.. a Utah corporation, Peter Lowe, 
Jr., J. Randall Outsell, Tracy M. Jones, 
Richard H. Lowe, and Don Bailey Con-
struction, Inc., a Utah corporation, De-
fendants. 
Peter LOWE. Jr., and Richard H. Lowe, 
Cross-Complainants, Third-Party 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
DON BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC.. 
a Utah corporation, Cross-Defendants 
and Respondents, 
and 
Don Bailey, Draper Bank, a Utah corpo-
ration, and J acobsen-Robbing Con-
struction Company, Inc., a Utah corpo-
ration. Third-Party Defendants. 
No. 860018-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 1, 1987. 
Creditor brought action to recover 
against guarantors of obligation. The 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Dean E. Conder, J., granted sum-
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mary judgment for creditor, and guaran-
tors appealed The Court, of Appeals, 
Carff, J., held that; (1) whether bank had 
control over collateral securing note guar-
anteed by guarantors, and in fact released 
collateral, presented factual questions pre-
cluding summary judgment against abso-
lute guarantors absent guarantors' express 
consent to bank's impairment of collateral, 
ami (2) award of attorney fees upon grant-
ing of summary judgment was improper. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Guaranty <*»42(1) 
Guaranties given for business' debt 
were unconditional, in that guarantors ab-
solutely guaranteed payment and there 
were no additional clauses stating express 
or implied conditions on liability or contrac-
tual requirement that creditor seek satis-
faction elsewhere on guaranty, and thus 
guarantors' liability became fixed upon de-
fault of primary obligor. 
2. Subrogation *»31(3) 
Guarantor, whether absolute or condi-
tional, has right of subrogation to any col-
lateral pledged as security upon payment 
of guaranteed obligation. 
3. Guaranty <*=»607i 
Where creditor's actions impair value 
of collateral in its possession which secures 
obligation guaranteed by guarantor, either 
absolute or conditional, guarantor will be 
discharged from his obligation to extent of 
impairment, unless guarantor consents to 
such impairment. U.C.A.1963, 70A-3-
6CHHI). 
4. Guaranty *»72 
Language in guaranty regarding guar-
antors' liability for any loans made to debt-
or, whether secured or unsecured, did not 
explicitly waive guarantors' subrogation 
rights to collateral, and thus did not consti-
tute express consent by guarantors to 
bank's impairment of collateral. 
5. Judgment <*»181(22) 
Whether bank had control over collat-
eral securing note guaranteed by guaran-
tors, and in fact released collateral, 
presented factual questions precluding 
summary judgment against absolute guar-
antors absent guarantors' express consent 
to bank's impairment of collateral. 
6. Costs <&*172 
Award of attorney fees upon granting 
of summary judgment in action on guaran 
ty was improper where judgment was en-
tered before guarantor had opportunity to 
see and respond to creditor's affidavit on 
attorney fees, and guarantors rebutted 
creditor's affidavit. 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Richard Hincks, Niel-
sen & Senior, Salt Lake City, for Jacobsen-
Robbing Const. Co. 
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, for 
Draper Hank and Trust. 
Arthur F. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for 
Tracy Jones. 
K.L. Mclff, Jackson, Mclff & Mower, 
Richfield, for Peter M. Lowe, Jr. and Rich-
ard H. Lowe. 
Paul D. Veasy, W. Jeffery Fillmore, 
Biele, Haslam & Hatch, Salt Lake City, for 
Valley Bank and Trust Co. 
Before ORME, DAVIDSON and 
GARFF, JJ. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant* Peter Lowe, Jr. and Richard 
H. Lowe appeal from a summary judgment 
in favor of plaintiff Valley Bank and Trust 
(Bank) finding defendants liable as guaran-
tors of a promissory note executed by Rite 
Way Concrete Forming, inc. (Rite Way) 
and awarding plaintiff attorney fees. We 
remand for hearing consistent with this 
opinion. 
Rite Way executed a promissory note for 
$16,000.00 at 12.76% interest per annum in 
favor of the Bank for the purpose of pur-
chasing concrete forming equipment from 
Conesco, a concrete forming equipment 
supplier. This note was secured by collat-
eral consisting of the concrete forming 
equipment and a 1977 Chevrolet two-ton 
flat-bed truck, and by the personal guaran-
tees of several persons, including Peter and 
Richard Lowe. 
i^&ii i^^ ^ iMf,%?> ^ ' f e ^ i t f ^ 
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After execution of the note and the ae-
curity agreements, the I*owes conveyed all 
of their interest in Rite Way to Don Bailey 
Construction, Inc. (Bailey), which assumed 
the $15,000.00 obligation to the Bank. In 
connection with this transaction, Kite Way 
transferred ownership of the flat-bed truck 
and the cement forming equipment to Bail-
ey, which subsequently subcontracted to do 
work for Jacobsen-Robbins Construction 
Co., a general contractor. Upon Bailey's 
failure to satisfactorily complete the sub-
contract, it surrendered the secured equip-
ment to Jacobsen-Robbins and defaulted on 
the loan obligation to the Bank. Upon 
Bailey's default, the Rank sued and entered 
default judgment against it. However, 
Don Bailey, the corporate owner, disap-
peared and the corporation ceased doing 
business without satisfying the debt. 
The Bank then accelerated the note and 
demanded that the Ix>wes pay the entire 
balance of $4,494.71 because of their per 
sonal guaranties. The l^owos refused to 
pay the balance, but, instead, met with 
Bank officers and offered to locate the 
collateral and assist with its repossession. 
They spent a considerable amount of time 
and effort doing so, and allege that they 
succeeded in locating virtually all of the 
secured equipment on the Jacobsen Rob-
bins job sites. They also assert that they 
gave the Bank a specific description of the 
equipment and its location, and authorized 
the Bank to repossess it. For purposes of 
reviewing this summary judgment, we re-
view the facta and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the Lowes. Allan Corp 
v. Clows Natl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987). 
Although the Bank never acquired actual 
physical control over the collateral, it is 
unclear whether it had the opportunity or 
the right U> do so. On October 12, 1982, 
without the l^owes' awareness or consent, 
and reserving its righta against Rite Way,1 
the Bank released it* interest in the cement 
forms in Jacobsen-Robbins' possession af-
ter Jacobsen-Robbins notified the Bank 
that Conesco claimed ownership of the 
I. The Bank's release stated that "(b]y disclaim-
ing any interest in and to the forms set forth as 
described herein. Valley Bank and Trust Compa 
forms. Under the summary judgment 
standard of review, we assume the truth-
fulness of the I .owes' s tatement that these 
cement forms were substantially the same 
equipment described in the security agree-
ment As a consequence of this release, 
the Bank was unable to satisfy the loan 
balance from the collateral. 
The Bank brought a successful motion 
for summary judgment against the Low en. 
The trial court in a memorandum decision 
found that the lx>wes' guaranty was abso-
lute and unconditional because it provided 
that the guarantors "severally guarantee 
payment when due of any and all obli-
gations of Borrowers to Bank when due or 
any and all obligations of Borrower to 
Bank now existing or which may hereafter 
arise of whatsoever nature and however 
represented, and whether secured or unse-
cured" (emphasis in original). 
The trial court entered judgment in favor 
of the Bank for $4,494 71 principal, 
$1,884.78 interest, $2,800.00 attorneys ' 
fees, and $51.50 court costa. 
The Lowes raise the following issues on 
appeal. (1) In releasing the collateral, did 
the Bank discharge the l^owes from their 
guaranty agreements? (2) Was the award 
of attorney fees against the Ixvwes improp-
er? 
I. 
The first issue is whether the Lowes 
were discharged from their guaranty 
agreements when the Bank released the 
collateral securing the loan. 
Whether a creditor has a duty to pursue 
the debtor or the collateral securing the 
loan as a precondition to pursuing the 
guarantor depends "on the nature of the 
guarantor ' s promise." Strevell Paterson 
Co. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741, 743 (Utah 
1982) (quoting Westinghouse Credit Corp. 
v. Hydrosunft Corp., 628 R2d 156, 168 
(Utah 1974)). 
The nature of the guarantor 's promise 
depends upon whether it is absolute or 
ny does not release or waive any right under its 
Security Interest and Financing Statement with 
Rite-Way Concrete Forming, Inc., Debtor, . . ." 
? * 
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conditional. An absolute guaranty is de-
fined as: 
a contract by which the guarantor has 
promised that if the debtor does not per-
form his obligation or obligations, the 
guarantor will perform some act (such us 
the payment of money) to or for the 
benefit of the creditor.... A guaranty of 
the payment of an obligation, without 
words of limitation or condition, is con-
strued as an absolute or unconditional 
guaranty. 
88 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty § 21 (1968). This 
unconditional obligation, sometimes re-
ferred to as a guaranty of payment, holds 
the guarantor liable, without notice, upon 
the default of the principal. Mack /Y/i. 
Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho HM, 606 P.2d 998, 
998 (1980). Such a guaranty is "absolute, 
and the guaranteed party need not fix its 
losses by pursuing its remedies against the 
debtor or the security before proceeding 
directly against the guarantor." Strevelt-
Paterson Co. v. Francis, 646 P.2d at 748. 
On the other hand, a conditional guaran-
ty, or guaranty of collection, is an obli-
gation to pay or perforin if payment or 
performance cannot be first reasonably ob-
tained from the principal obligor, Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Strevell-Pa-
terson, found that the guaranty contract at 
issue was an absolute guaranty of payment 
rather than a guaranty of collection, be-
cause it "contained no express or implied 
condition on liability and no contractual 
requirement that the creditor seek satisfac-
tion elsewhere before commencing action 
on the guarantee." Id. at 748-44. 
[ l j Likewise, the present guaranty con-
tract contains language that indicates that 
it is an absolute guaranty of payment rath-
er than only a guaranty of collection: 
"VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COM-
PANY," a corporation, hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Bank", has extended credit 
and/or agreed to extend credit and/or 
furnished or agreed to furnish other ac-
comodations to the person hereinafter 
identified as "Borrower", and the under-
signed Guarantors, in consideration of 
such credit and/or accomodations by 
Bank to Borrower jointly and severally 
guarantee payment when due of any 
and all obligations of Borrower to 
Bank now existing or which may here-
ajler arise of whatsoever nature and 
however represented, and whether se-
cured or unsecured (emphasis added). 
As in Strevell-Paterson, there are no 
additional clauses stating an "express or 
implied condition on liability," nor is there a 
contractual requirement that the creditor 
seek satisfaction elsewhere on the guaran-
ty. See StnrvellPaterson, 646 P.2d at 744. 
Therefore, tlie Lowes' liability for tlie loan 
became fixed upon the default of the pri-
mary obligor, Don Bailey. 
12,3 J However, a guarantor, upon pay-
ment of tlie guaranteed obligation, has a 
right of subrogation to any collateral 
pledged as security. Behlen Mjg. Co. v. 
First National Bank, 28 Colo.App. 300, 
472 P.2d 703, 706 (1970); D. W. Jaguays A 
Co. v. ftrat Security Bank, 101 Ariz. 301, 
419 P.2d 86, 89 (1966). This is true even of 
an absolute guarantor. This right to sub-
rogation is a "creature of equity," whose 
"purpose is the prevention of injustice and 
is the mode which equity adopts to compel 
the ultimate payment of a debt by one who 
ui justice, equity, and good conscience 
ought to pay it." Behlen Mfg. Co., 472 
P.2d at 707 (quoting D.W. Jaguays A Co., 
419 P.2d at 88). The rationale is that the 
creditor, having elected to proceed against 
security for payment of the debt, is deemed 
to be in a trustee relationship with the 
guarantor. The creditor may liquidate the 
security and apply the proceeds to the obli-
gation, or he may forego recourse to the 
security and proceed against the guarantor 
of payment, provided he does not subvert 
tlie guarantor's subrogation rights against 
collateral pledged by the principal obligor. 
If he breaches that trust duty by destroy-
ing, losing, or otherwise improvidently dis-
sipating the collateral, he may not hold tlie 
guarantor wholly liable because the guar-
antor would have been subrogated to the 
creditor's right of resort to that security. 
38 AmJur.2d Guaranty § 84 (1968). 
Thus, where a creditor's actions impair the 
value of collateral in its possession which 
secures an obligation guaranteed by a 
& M M ^ i&tfWy 
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mrantor, either absolute or conditional, 
e guarantor will be discharged from his 
•ligation to the extent of the impairment, 
ack Mn. Corp. v. Scott, 606 P.2d at 998. 
This general rule has been codified in 
tab through the Uniform Commercial 
wie. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-
16(1X1980) states: 
The holder discharges any party to the 
instrument to the extent that without 
such party's consent the holder .. . (b) 
unjustifiably impairs any collateral for 
the instrument given by or on behalf of 
the party or any person against whom he 
has a right of recourse. 
Appellants rely on this general rule to 
ipport their argument that they should 
icape liability on their guaranty contracts 
'cause the Hank's release of the collateral 
as unjustified. 
However, as an exception to this general 
ile, an absolute guarantor may explicitly 
awe his rights against collateral Under 
le language of Section 70A-8-606(l)(b), 
le holder does not discharge a party to the 
istrument if the party consents to allow 
\e holder to impair the collateral. Thus, a 
nding that the guarantors so consented 
mders Section 3-606 discharge unavail-
tde even if the holder unjustifiably impairs 
le collateral. The Official Comment to 
pction !M>06 of the Uniform Commercial 
ode indicates that such consent may be 
iven in advance in the guaranty agree-
lent: 
Consent may be given in advance, and is 
commonly incoq>orated in the instru-
ment. It requires no consideration, and 
operates as a waiver of the consenting 
party's right to claim his own discharge. 
ee also National Acceptance Co. of 
merica v. Demes, 446 F.Supp. 388, 390 
1111.1977). 
Such consent must be explicit and 
should only be by the most unequivocal 
tnguage in the guaranty agreement." 
lehlen Mfg. Co., 472 P.2d at 708 (quoting 
The specific provisions In the guaranty agree 
ment were as follows: Behlen agreed "to fully 
indemnify and save the Bank harmless against 
all expense, loss, damage or injury arising in 
v. RITE WAY CONCRETE Utah 109 
109 (lltfthApp. 1987) 
II W. Jaquai/s <ir Co., 419 P.2d at 89); See 
also Mack hn. Corp., 606 P.2d at 1000. 
For example, an explicit contract was 
found in Joe Heaston Tractor dr Imple-
ment Co. v Sec. Acceptance Corp., 248 
F.2d 196, 198 n. 1 (10th Cir.1957): 
The undersigned grants to the Finance 
Company full power to modify or change 
terms of any of the Liabilities, to agree 
to forbearance with respect thereto, to 
consent to the substitution or exchange 
or release of collateral thereto, and ex-
tension of time of payment of the Liabili-
ties. 
Likewise, the guaranty agreement in Na-
tional Acceptance Co. of America v. 
Denies, 446 F.Supp. at 390, was found to be 
an unequivocal waiver of rights against 
collateral. 
The undersigned hereby waive notice of 
the following events or occurrences: . . . 
the holder's obtaining, amending, substi-
tuting or releasing, waiving, or modify-
ing any . . . security interests, liens, or 
encumbrances; |or) . . . the holder's . . . 
hereafter accepting .. . any collateral se-
curing the payment . . . or said holder's 
settling, subordinating, compromising, 
discharging, or releasing the same. The 
undersigned agree that the holder of the 
Note may . do any or all of the fore-
going events or occurrences in such man-
ner, upon such terms and at such timers 
as said holder, in its sole and absolute 
discretion, deems advisable, without in 
any way or respect impairing, affecting, 
reducing, or releasing the undersigned 
from their obligations hereunder... . 
Id. See also Schauss v. Garner, 690 P.2d 
1816 (Wyo.1979). 
In contrast, the court in Behlen MJg. Co. 
found that language in the guaranty agree-
ment * did not meet this test because "the 
only waiver in the guaranty agreement 
(had] to do with notice of nonpayment, 
protest, extension of the note and partial 
payment. There I was J no waiver relating 
to the collateral. The indemnity agree-
connectlon with thr nhove nole, or in (he ac-
ceptance of any collateral therefor, or which 
may be incurred in enforcing collection of the 
same " Behlen Mfo. Co., 472 P.2d at 706. 
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merit is limited to expense, loss or damage 
incurred in accepting the collateral or in-
curred in enforcing collection." Id., 472 
P.2d at 708, (emphasis added). See also 
Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho 889, 
606 P.2d 993, 1000 (1980). 
Similarly, the Arizona court, in Jaquays, 
found that guarantors' subrogation rights 
were not impaired because consent to im-
pair the collateral was not explicitly given, 
stating that the following language was 
insufficient to constitute an unequivocal 
waiver of rights against the collateral: 
"and in connection therewith consents with-
out notice to any extensions or forbearance 
by assignee, and waives any demand or 
notice of default." Jaquays, 419 P.2d at 
88. 
[4] In the present case, there are no 
explicit waivers of rights against collateral 
in the Lowes' guaranty agreements. The 
only language which could be remotely con-
strued to be a waiver of rights against 
collateral states that the Lowes "jointly 
and severally guarantee payment when due 
of any and all obligations of Borrower to 
Hank now existing or which may hereafter 
arise of whatsoever nature and however 
represented, whether secured or unse-
cured." 
In interpreting this language, we recog-
nize that an instrument purporting to es-
tablish liability against a guarantor must 
be construed strictly, and any ambiguities 
must be resolved against the drafter of the 
instrument. National Acceptance Co. of 
America v. Denies, 440 F.Supp at 391. 
This present language deals with the guar 
antors' liability for any loans made to the 
debtor, whether secured or unsecured, not 
with any waiver relating to collateral. 
Construed strictly against the Hank, it does 
not explicitly waive any subrogation rights 
to collateral. 
3. The Bank conceded, for purposes of this ap-
peal only, thai it had such control. Our deci-
sion in no way precludes the Hank from proving 
at trial that it, in fact, hud no such control. 
4. The relevant portion of the loan contract 
states, "(a]II costs and expenses of Bank, in 
retaking, holding, preparing for sale and selling 
or otherwise realizing upon the collateral in the 
event of default by Borrower, including court 
Therefore, assuming the Bank had con-
trol over the collateral, as the Lowes con-
tend, we conclude that it had a duty to 
preserve the Lowes' interest in the proper-
ty held as security and that performance of 
this duty was not waived by the Lowes' 
unconditional guaranties because the 
Lowes did riot expressly consent to impair-
ment of the collateral. See Jaquays, 419 
P.2d at 89. 
[6J Whether the Lowes can prevail, 
however, depends upon two factors: If the 
forms which the Lowes found were the 
actual collateral and, if so, whether the 
Hank had control over them.3 Further, a 
guarantor is released from his liability only 
to the extent of the injury caused by the 
failure of the creditor to protect his securi-
ty interest, if the creditor was in control of 
the property held as security. Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-3-606(l) (1980); see Jaquays, 
419 P.2d at 89; Mack FitL Corp. v. Scott, 
606 P.2d at 998. 
Since there are genuine issues of materi-
al fact as to whether the Bank had control 
over the collateral and whether the forms 
released by the Bank were, in fact, the 
collateral securing the note guaranteed by 
the Lowes, the summary judgment must be 
set aside. Atlas, 737 P.2d at 229. This 
conclusion renders any discussion concern-
ing disposition of the collateral in a com-
mercially reasonable manner unnecessary. 
II. 
The second issue raised by appellants 
was whether the award of $2,800 in attor-
ney fees was proper. It is undisputed that 
the Lowes were liable for attorney fees.4 
What is at issue is the amount of the fee. 
On February 24, 1984, Veasy, the Bank's 
counsel, filed an affidavit in support of 
attorney fees with the court, but failed to 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees and legal 
expenses, shall constitute additional indebted-
ness of the Borrower secured hereby which the 
borrower promises to pay on demand." The 
Guaranty agreement is in accord: "Each Guar 
antor agrees to pay all costs and expenses, in-
cluding reasonable attorney's fees incurred tn 
enforcing this agreement." 
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nerve a copy on Mclff, counsel for the 
Lowes. Mclff received, on Feb. 27, 1984, a 
copy of the proposed judgment from Veasy 
which indicated that the Lowes were liable 
for $2,800.00 in attorney fees. He called 
Veasy that day to inform him of the lack of 
affidavits or documentation supporting the 
award of attorney fees and, on Feb. 28, 
1984, filed an affidavit alleging that the 
attorney fee award was excessive and the 
supporting affidavit was not timely filed. 
The trial court entered judgment on 
March 6, 1984, for $4,494.71 principal, 
$1,884.78 interest, $2,800.00 attorney fees, 
and $61.60 court costs. Mclff stated that 
he finally received a copy of the affidavit in 
support of attorney fees on March 7, 1984, 
and, on the same day, filed a motion in 
opposition to plaintiff's affidavit in support 
of attorney fees. On April 4, 1984, Mclff 
filed an affidavit in which he brought these 
facts again to the court's attention. 
(61 The Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that "(e|ven if there were no disputed issue 
of material fact, the summary judgment 
cannot award an attorney's fee without a 
stipulation as to the amount, an unrebutted 
affidavit, or evidence given as to the value 
thereof." Prted h\n. Co. v. Stoker Motor 
Co., 637 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1976). In 
the instant case, there was not only a lapse 
of due process in that judgment was en-
tered before appellant had an opportunity 
to see and respond to respondent's affida-
vit on attorney fees, but appellants rebut-
ted respondent's affidavit. Accordingly, 
the award of attorney fees was improper. 
Since the judgment appealed from is re-
versed, the award of attorney fees falls as 
well, and fresh consideration of the attor-
ney fee question will, of course, be appro-
priate. 
Reversed and remanded for trial consist-
ent with this opinion. 
DAVIDSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
Gall C. VAN TASSELL, and Afton Van 
Tassel I, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
Elwood C. SHAFFER. Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860082-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 1, 1987. 
Judgment creditors brought action to 
reaffirm judgments, and defendant moved 
for summary judgment on basis of statute 
of limitations. The District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Kenneth Kigtrup, J., deter-
mined that statute of limitations period was 
tolled during defendant's absences from 
state, and defendant appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (I) 
except in proceedings brought under Non-
resident Motorist Act, statute of limitations 
periods are tolled during defendant's ab-
sences even though defendant was amena-
ble to service of process, and (2) trial court 
correctly calculated defendant's absences 
from state for purpose of tolling statute of 
limitations by excluding first day of period 
and including last day. 
Affirmed. 
f «IVNUNM»tVSTIM> 
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1. Limitation of Actions <*»84(2) 
Statute of limitations for all actions 
other than proceedings under Nonresident 
Motorist Act are tolled during defendant's 
absences, even though defendant is amena-
ble to service of process within state. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 4. 
2. Time «=»9(2) 
In action to reaffirm judgments 
against defendant, trial court correctly cal-
culated defendant's absences from state 
for purpose of tolling statute of limitations, 
by excluding first day of period of defend-
ant's absence but including last day. U.C. 
A. 1963, 68-3-7. 
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